Liebe ist nicht in der Luft

The topic is gay marriage.

While living in Toronto this past summer, I happened to espy a poster taped to a lamp-post relating to Margaret Somerville's reception of an honourary degree from Ryerson University at its upcoming convocation ceremony. For those unfamiliar with Somerville, she is a prominent ethicist currently working at McGill University in Montreal. The poster was a call to anyone who supported gay marriage to come out and protest Ryerson's choice to bestow this particular honour on Somerville. She had, I discovered, recently published an ethics paper that made a case against gay marriage, and this had stirred many members of the gay community into action.

My first reaction on seeing the poster was to roll my eyes, scoffing at the gall of individuals who chose to continue discriminating against the gay community from platforms of religion/homophobia/etc. This also appears to have been the lasting reaction of most people who eventually attended the protest. Within a few moments, however, I became curious about the issue. You may have noticed a few curious points poking out of this issue already. My first question was: Why would Ryerson University choose to publically honour a sexually discriminating bigot? Further, why would McGill University choose to employ a sexually discriminating bigot? Two relatively liberal Canadian universities would likely be a little more sensitive to such things, wouldn't they? A little research into the subject showed me that, in fact, they would and are.

A quick Google search turned up Somerville's contended paper, The Case Against “Same-Sex Marriage”. After reading the paper, I was struck by a few things:

1) Somerville is very careful to limit her argument to perceived ethical concerns surrounding gay marriage. She is extremely clear that any arguments against gay marriage that stem from religious or homophobic sources are discriminatory and completely unacceptable.

2) The article is intelligently written, and derives reasonable and logical conclusions from each premise.

That is not to say that I agree with everything in it, only that its presentation is logical, respectful, and above all, not homophobic. Somerville clearly states:

“The reason for excluding same-sex couples from marriage matters: If the reason for denying same-sex marriage is that we have no respect for homosexuals and their relationships, or want to give the message that homosexuality is wrong, then, the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not ethically acceptable from the perspective of respect for homosexuals and their relationships. It is also discrimination.”

So, given all this, I wanted to discuss some of its contents.

I'll begin with one issue that I disagree with. From Somerville's paper:

“Advocates of same-sex marriage also argue that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples based on society’s need for an institution that symbolizes the inherently procreative relationship between a man and a woman, means that opposite-sex couples who cannot or do not want to have children should be excluded from marriage, or, more extremely, that only a man and a woman who produce a child should be allowed to marry.

Marriage between opposite-sex partners symbolizes, however, the reproductive potential that exists, at a general level, between a man and a woman. Even if a particular man and woman cannot or do not want to have a child, their getting married does not damage this general symbolism. The reproductive potential of opposite-sex couples is assumed at a general level and is not investigated in individual cases. To do otherwise would be a serious and unjustifiable breach of privacy. It is also sometimes argued that the absence of a reproductive potential is obvious “on the face of the record” when a woman well past the age of child-bearing enters a marriage and yet we recognize such marriages. But again these marriages do not damage the reproductive symbolism of marriage in the way that same-sex marriages would. Indeed, they continue this symbolism at the grandparent level and, therefore, across the generations.”

Now, as I see it, simply because investigating the reproductive potential of opposite-sex partners is invasive, does not mean that it is ultimately unimportant to the issue. If one is to argue that marriage should only be allowed based on its potential for reproduction, then the potential for reproduction must be measured. If it is decided that the issue is too invasive to be ethically investigated, then investigating and discriminating based on the gender of the partners involved in such a union must also be too invasive. Gender and reproductive potential can be linked in a case like this because the reasons for investigating the gender of the partners involved is also to determine their reproductive potential. That a gay couple’s gender is more immediately apparent than a straight couple’s fertility is irrelevant, since the straight couple’s right to marriage would not be taken away, hypothetically, if they chose to make public their infertility. Thus, we are left with two paths: If it is deemed ethically acceptable to investigate the reproductive potential of a homosexual couple, it must be ethically acceptable to investigate the reproductive potential of a heterosexual couple. If it is acceptable in both cases, then only heterosexual couples who actually, as opposed to symbolically, possess reproductive potential should be allowed to marry. If, on the other hand, it is not acceptable to investigate the reproductive potential of heterosexual couples, then it must also not be acceptable to investigate the reproductive potential of homosexual couples. If it is unacceptable in both cases, then homosexual marriage should be permitted.

I would welcome feedback on this, since I feel somewhat daunted, as a high school music teacher-in-training, critiquing a prominent and well-respected ethicist's work.

Somerville's next point I have been unable to make much headway on, so I'll put it out there for feedback as well:

“Our societies have also adopted adult-centred as compared with child-centred reproductive decision-making. Child-centred means, among other requirements, that we should work from a presumption that, if at all possible, children have a valid claim to be raised by their own biological parents. We must consider the ethics of intentionally creating a situation that is otherwise: It requires justification.

There is an ethical difference between individuals choosing to create such a situation and society authorizing or facilitating it. While society would have ethical obligations not to interfere with the freedom of individuals in relation to reproduction (subject to restrictions on the use of reproductive technologies, discussed below), it also has obligations not to facilitate the creation of situations that are not in the “best interests” of children. In short, the compliance of society in helping to create non-traditional families in which children will be raised is not an ethically neutral act.

One common response to the position I outline above, by those advocating same-sex marriage and families, is to point out the deficiencies of marriage. The issue is not, however, whether all or most opposite-sex couples attain the ideals of marriage in relation to fulfilling the needs of the children they produce. Neither is the issue whether marriage is a perfect institution — it is not. It is, rather, whether we should work from a basic presumption that children need a mother and a father, preferably their own biological parents. I believe they do. The issue is, also, whether society would be worse off without the aspirational ideals established by traditional marriage. I believe it would be.”

What do you think? Do children ideally need a mother and father? Are there any other frameworks that might be proposed as an alternative?

-------

CBC.ca - Honorary degree sparks protests at Ryerson